





On May 10, 1964, the Tunisian National Assembly shocked the world by
rushing through a bill nationalizing all farmland owned by foreigners.1
Much of the one million acres of land 2 and other assets were seized from
large French corporations. 3 In a fiery speech, Tunisian President Habib
Bourguiba proclaimed that Tunisia had suffered enough under eighty-three
years of French exploitation and summarily rejected an earlier agreement
with France whereby Tunisia could buy back foreign property holdings
remaining from colonial rule. 4 He defended his drastic action by declaring
*Mr. Soley practices law in Washington, D.C. with the firm of Venable, Baetjer, Howard
& Civiletti. The author wishes to thank former President Jimmy Carter, Judge Jack Etheridge
and Georges R. Delaume for their constructive comments on this article. The views expressed
herein, however, are strictly those of the author.
1. THE ECONOMIST, May 16, 1964, at 307; N.Y. Times, May 13, 1964, at 17, col. 2; The Times
(London), May 13, 1964, at 12, col. 1. The Tunisian action coincided with the eighty-third
anniversary of the Bardo Treaty that turned Tunisia into a French protectorate. THE
ECONOMIST, May 16, 1964, at 708.
2. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1964, at 17, col. 2; The Times (London), May 13, 1964, at 12, col. 1.
Of this land, approximately 675,000 acres belonged to French citizens and corporations,
110,000 acres belonged to Italians, and 37,000 acres owned by Maltese subjects of Britain. N.Y.
Times, May 13, 1964, at 17, col. 2.
3. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1964, at 17, col. 2; The Times (London), May 13, 1964, at 12, col. 1.
The French owned nearly 70% of the land seized; of the expropriated French owned land,
almost half belonged to large French corporations. THE ECONOMIST, May 16, 1964, at 708.
4. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1964, at 19, col. 2; The Times (London), May 13,1964, at 12, col. 1.
Under an earlier agreement with France, the French government had agreed to allow Tunisia to
buy foreign land holdings gradually over a span of five years in exchange for a fixed rate of
compensation. However, these compensation costs placed a heavy drain on Tunisia's foreign
exchange reserves. In nationalizing the land immediately, President Bourguiba maintained that
the French should pay these costs to make up for the exploitation that Tunisia had suffered
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that, while this measure would be inconsequential to the French, it was "a
question of life or death ' 5 for newly independent Tunisia.6
The French reaction was sharp and immediate. Ignoring Bourguiba's call
for continued cooperation, General Charles de.Gaulle vigorously de-
nounced Tunisia's "brutal" actions. 7 After a quickly convened cabinet
meeting, the French government responded by completely suspending vast
sums of financial aid intended for Tunisia. 8 The French ambassador was
quickly recalled to Paris "for consultations."
9
This critical turn of events caught the world financial community by
surprise.10 It was widely feared that the sudden tension would lead to a
resumption of the Franco-Tunisian hostility that had resulted in thousands
of casualties just a few years earlier." Expropriated property holders
appealed to international institutions such as the World Bank, but found
these institutions ill-equipped to handle the situation. 12 Consequently, dis-
placed businessmen sought aid from France and escalated the essentially
financial tension into a political crisis.
This event is only one example of the dozens of international incidents
between foreign investors and host states that confronted the World Bank in
the 1950s and 1960s. 13 While the Tunisian debacle gradually faded into
obscurity, it and other threatened international flare-ups underlined the
serious lack of an intermediary apparatus to prevent investment disputes
from becoming dangerously political.
Soon after the Tunisian crisis died down, the World Bank sought to
eradicate this gap by promoting one of the most ambitious international
attempts to resolve investment disputes between foreign private investors
under French rule and also pointed out that French companies were "running down" the land
before they left. THE TIMES (London), May 13, 1964, at 12, col. 1.
5. N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1964, at 17, col. 2.
6. Tunisia was granted independence from France on March 25, 1956. It had been a French
protectorate since 1881. THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1185 (J. Paxton 117th ed. 1980).
7. N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
8. THE ECONOMIST, May 16, 1964, at 708; N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1964, at 4, col. 3.
9. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1964, at 4, col. 3.
10. N.Y. TIMES, May 13,1964, at 17, col. 2; The Times (London), May 13,1964, at 12, col. 1.
11. Sterling, 25 REPORTER 24 (Sept. 28, 1961); The Times (London), May 13, 1964, at 12,
col. 1.
12. Confidential sources within the World Bank; ICSID, History of the Convention, Vol. II,
Pt. 1, Doc. 4, p. 6, Doc. 25, p. 240 (1968); see generally, Sutherland, The World Bank
Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 367,367-78 (1979);
Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURs 2: 333 (1972).
13. See Sutherland, supra note 12, at 373-78. For example, the World Bank played a major
role in settling the violent dispute between Britain and Egypt following the nationalization of
the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Id. at 373-74; E. LAUTERPACHT, SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT 3
(1966). The Bank also acted in conciliation proceedings over the City of Tokyo's refusal to fully
repay a thirty year loan to French bondholders. Sutherland, supra, at 374; Domke, Dispute
Settlement of International Loans, 1964 INT'L FINANCING & INVESTMENT 524, 542-43.
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and sovereign statesa--the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. 15 Developed to fill
an existing abyss in dispute resolution, as well as to stimulate and protect a
greater flow of capital into Third World nations,' 6 the Convention created
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) 17 and established binding guidelines under which a nation and a
foreign national may choose to resolve their differences. 18 Under the Con-
vention, all parties to this treaty are obligated to recognize and enforce an
ICSID arbitral award.' 9 To date, the Convention had been signed by ninety-
one states and ratified by eighty-seven of these signators. 21,
Through its careful balance between the interests of investors and those of
contracting states, the Convention has succeeded in furthering foreign
investment in developing nations. 21 Investors with an ICSID provision in
their contracts with a foreign state receive direct access to an international
forum that can impartially arbitrate, even in the absence of the state, and
enforce an award as a final judgment in the courts of any member country.22
The states acquired a similar means of proceeding against an errant investor
in a foreign jurisdiction.23 Thus, the ICSID treaty totally circumvents a
traditional area of global hostility by requiring that all disputes between
states and multinational investors be resolved through an international
arbitration apparatus enforceable by every signer of the treaty.24
14. Feverle, International Arbitrators and Choice of Law Under Article 42 of the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 4 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 89 (1977).
15. Done at Washington, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
16. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, para. 12, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 524
(1965); see also Sutherland, supra note 12; Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection and
ICSID Arbitration, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343 (1974); Albrecht, Some Legal Questions
Concerning the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 679 (1968). For a very indepth and more
extensive discussion of ICSID, see G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, ch. 15 (1982).
17. ICSID CONVENTION art. 1(1). The Centre is currently located in Washington, D.C.
18. These guidelines are set forth in arts. 25-75. As provided under art. 6, ICSID has also
published a more comprehensive set of regulations and rules. Art. 44 enforces this framework.
As for the basic procedure of the treaty, the Convention allows contracting parties to choose
between arbitration and non-binding conciliation. Under the Convention, the parties are free
to appoint arbitrators or conciliators either from panels compiled by ICSID or from other
sources. If called upon, ICSID will appoint disinterested people from its panels.
19. ICSID CONVENTION arts. 53-54. Under the Convention, parties to a dispute select their
own arbitration tribunal to operate under the ICSID guidelines. If agreement cannot be
reached on selection of arbitrators, ICSID picks members off the panels that it maintains. Arts.
12 and 13 also provide for a conciliation panel if the disputants opt against arbitration.
20, ICSID NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1985). Indeed, the ICSID Convention has been
ratified by more states than any other arbitration treaty. Broches, Settlement of Disputes Arising
Out of Investment in Developing Countries, 11 INT'L Bus. L. 206, 208 (1983).
21. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 A.J.I.L. 784, 790-91 (1983).
22. ICSID CONVENTION art. 53. 54.
23. Id.
24. Such immunity poses a serious problem where, for example, French investors seek to
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This article initially examines the existing ICSID framework and assesses
the implementation of the Convention throughout the world. The focus
then shifts to an examination of adherence to the treaty by the United
States, emphasizing American enforcement of arbitral awards in light of
foreign sovereign immunity.
II. The ICSID Framework for Actions Against Foreign States
A. GENERAL
The Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes creates a
completely autonomous jurisdictional system which arbitrates disputes be-
tween investors and host states.25 The cornerstone of ICSID jurisdiction lies
in the initial mutual consent of the parties. 26 Once a private investor and a
state agree to the Convention's authority over any future disagreements, the
agreement acts as a binding and irrevocable consent that cannot be uni-
laterally withdrawn. 27 The Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, acting independently of any national interference, receives requests
for arbitration and exercises full control over the dispute until a final award
has been recognized and enforced by a domestic court of a member nation.28
As an added advantage, the Centre is also a relatively inexpensive means
of resolving international conflicts. 29 Unlike other international investment
arbitration institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce and
the American Arbitration Association, the Centre's fee is based on the
actual costs incurred by its already subsidized staff and not on a percentage
of the investment at stake. 30 The ICSID scheme is further unique due to its
effective apparatus set up to enforce awards and its requirement of irrevo-
cable consent.
31
have a United States court enforce an ICSID award against Tunisia-and Tunisia claims
immunity from the jurisdiction of American courts. If the United States or the legal system of
any other nation were to, in fact, grant this requested immunity, it would severely thwart the
purpose of the Convention by destroying the careful balance preserved between private
investor and sovereign nations. In addition to the threat to world peace, tampering with the
ICSID framework would endanger developing nations dependent on financial capital, and
place billions of dollars of foreign investment into greater risk.
25. Broches, supra note 20, at 208.
26. Id; ICSID Convention art. 25; Brief for Intervenor at 44, MINE v. Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 91 (1983).
27. Broches, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. ICSID administrative costs are limited to a $100 initial registration fee. The fees of
arbitrators are limited to approximately $650 per day plus travel and subsistence expenses.
Delaume, The ICSID and the Banker, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 9, 12 (October, 1983); see, generally,
McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries, 13 INT'L LAW. 211 (1979) (contrasts
various arbitration centers).
30. ICSID Doc. ICSID/12, at 3. While the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services
works with about 20,000 disputes annually, its scope is limited to mostly labor difficulties within
the United States.
31. Id.
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The essence of the Convention's enforcement mechanism is contained in
three articles regarding the implementation of ICSID awards. Article 53
states that an award rendered by arbitrators acting according to the rules
promulgated by the Centre shall be absolutely binding on the parties to the
dispute.32 There is to be no right of appeal or review by any domestic
court.33 More importantly, signers to the Convention guarantee that they
shall abide by and comply with all the terms of an award.34 The only
exceptions to total compliance are if the arbitration tribunal decides to stay
the enforcement of its award pending the possibility of interpreting, revis-
ing, or annulling the language.35
Under Article 54, the Convention details the compliance mandated for
the nation in which enforcement of the ICSID award is sought. 36 Once a
party brings a certified ICSID award before an appropriate court of a nation
privy to the ICSID treaty, the domestic court is legally bound to both
recognize and enforce the award exactly as if it was a final judgment from an
equivalent tribunal within that same country.37 A judgment, therefore,
must be rendered to enforce whatever pecuniary obligations have been
established.38
B. ENFORCEMENT-EXECUTION DISTINCTION
However, the Convention distinguishes between the notions of enforce-
ment and execution.39 While a domestic court must recognize and enforce
ICSID awards against states regardless of defenses such as sovereign immu-
nity and public policy, 40 Article 55 expressly does not touch upon the
execution-the actual seizing and selling of the debtor's property4 1--of the
judgment.42 This matter is left to the domestic procedures and sovereign
immunity laws existing in the country hearing the suit.43 Thus, judgments
rendered in accordance with the Convention are subject to different treat-
ment in the courts of each state which is a party to the treaty.44
32. ICSID CONVENTION art. 25(1).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. arts. 50-53.
36. Id. art. 54(1).
37. Id. art. 54(1), (2).
38. Id. art. 54(1).
39. Id. arts. 54, 55; see Delaume, supra note 21, at 799-800.
40. ICSID CONVENTION art. 54(1); see Delaume, supra note 21, at 797-799.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (5th ed. 1979)
42. ICSID CONVENTION art. 55.
43. Id; Delaume. supra note 21, at 800; Coil, United States Enforcement of ArbitralA wards
Against Sovereign States: Implications of the ICSID Convention, 17 HARV. J. INT'L L. 401
(1976); Delaume, 20 I.L.M. 877 (1981).




For example, assume that before investing in Tunisia, the French cor-
porations and the government of Tunisia agreed to take any future disputes
to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. As
both nations have now signed and ratified the ICSID treaty,45 the following
model arbitration 46 clause is placed in all the contracts:
The parties hereto consent to submit to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes any dispute in relation to or arising out of this Agreement for
settlement by arbitration pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States.47
Thus, binding and irrevocable consent within the ICSID framework is
created.48 At this point, assume that conflict flares up between Tunisia and
the French investors. As tensions increase, Tunisia nationalizes all the
French holdings. Subsequent negotiations fail to arrive at a solution.
As a settlement seems unlikely, the French conglomerates, acting under
their contracts, take the matter before ICSID. This may be done by either
party unilaterally submitting a written request to the Secretary-General of
ICSID in Washington, D.C. 49 It makes no difference whether Tunisia is still
willing to follow through with arbitration. 50 Having jurisdiction over legal
disputes "arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting State
...and a national of another Contracting State which the parties to the
45. Tunisia signed the treaty on May 5, 1965 and ratified it on Jun. 22, 1966, effective Oct. 14,
1966. France signed on Dec. 12, 1965, and ratified on Aug. 21, 1967, effective Jun. 20, 1967.
ICSID, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1983).
46. The Convention allows for conciliation as well as arbitration. See ICSID CONVENTION
arts. 28-35. However, most parties prefer to resort to arbitration since they are reluctant to go
through the entire conciliation process and end up with only a non-binding award. Out of the
eighteen cases that have been handled by the Centre to date, only two have involved concilia-
tion. Interview with Georges R. Delaume, Senior Legal Adviser to the World Bank, currently
assigned to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, in Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 19, 1984).
47. ICSID Model Clauses, Doc ICSID/5/Rev. 1, at 5 (Jul. 7, 1981). This is merely a simple
example of an ICSID clause. The Centre provides model clauses which are suitable for many
factual situations. For a detailed account of drafting ICSID clauses, see Delaume, Arbitration in
Practice 2-10 (ICSID pamphlet Aug. 1, 1983), forthcoming in 1 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. no. 2.
48. ICSID CONVENTION art. 25(1).
49. Any party wishing to institute conciliation or arbitration proceedings must address a
request (and five copies) in writing to: The Secretary-General, ICSID, 1818 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
The request, which may be made individually or jointly by the parties, must: indicate whether
it relates to conciliation or to arbitration; be drawn up in one of the official languages of ICSID
i.e., English, French or Spanish; be dated; be signed by the requesting party or parties; contain
evidence of consent to conciliation or arbitration under ICSID; and include information
relating to the parties to the dispute and the issues in dispute. The request may: set forth any
provisions agreed upon by the parties regarding the number of conciliators or arbitrators, and
the method of their appointment; and any other provisions agreed by the parties concerning the
settlement of the dispute. ICSID Doc. ICSID/12, at 8.
50. ICSID CONVENTION art. 25(1).
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dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre," 51 ICSID is bound to
accept the case.
Even if Tunisia refuses to cooperate with ICSID, the Secretary-General
of the Centre is authorized to appoint the panel of arbitrators. 52 The
arbitration is then completed despite Tunisia's refusal to attend 53 and,
hypothetically, an award is rendered in favor of the French corporations for
$100 million.
Ascertaining that Tunisia has a large amount of assets in American banks
and investments, the French corporations next take their award to a United
States district court 54 and demand that the United States comply with its
treaty obligations under the Convention55 to enforce a judgment of an
ICSID tribunal. Specifically, the corporation must invoke the Article 54
provision that every party to the ICSID treaty must recognize an award as
"binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State." 56
Under the terms of the Convention, the United States district court is not
to review the award in any manner or 57 object to any of the ICSID pro-
ceedings. 58
As the ICSID award is to be received by the court as a binding final
judgment,59 the United States court is restricted to a very limited role.60
Any defenses by Tunisia such as sovereign immunity or public policy would
be precluded.61 Indeed, Tunisia itself is obligated to comply with the terms
of the award. 62 According to the regime set out by the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, the Arbitral Tribunal has complete
authority over all matters before it63 and any effort to interpret, revise, or
annul the award must be made by the Secretary-General of the Centre and
51. Id.
52. Id. at art. 38. In about two-thirds of the cases, ICSID ends up appointing arbitrators.
Delaume, supra note 29, at 10, n. 8. The default of a party, therefore, does not frustrate ICSID
proceeding. Id. at 10.
53. Under Art. 45(2) the arbitration may still proceed even if a party refuses to appear.
54. In the United States, federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over ICSID
proceedings 22 § 1650a(b) (1976).
55. The United States signed the Convention on Aug. 27, 1965 and ratified it on Jun. 10,
1966, to be effective as of Oct. 14, 1966. ICSID SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1983).
56. ICSID CONVENTION, art. 54(1).
57. Id. at art. 53(1).
58. Id. at art. 41.
59. Id. art. 54(1).
60. ICSID CONVENTION art. 54(1); Interview with Delaume, supra note 46; Schmidt,
Arbitration under the Auspices ofICSID, 17 HARV. INT'L L. REV. 90, 105 (1976). Under Article
26 of the Convention, consent to ICSID arbitration is exclusive of any other remedy.
61. As the treaty mandates that the award be a binding final judgment, all defenses are
automatically precluded by this language. Id. art 54. No defenses to enforcement are provided
anywhere within the treaty. See also Delaume, supra note 21, at 797-799.
62. ICSID CONVENTION art. 53(1).
63. Id. at art. 41.
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ruled upon by the Arbitral Tribunal or an ad hoc committee appointed to
that effect.64 The domestic courts of a state are then required to defer to the
certified decision issued by the Centre. 65 Once it determines the award to be
bona fide, the forum state must enforce it. 66
The only exception to the Centre's authority is Article 55. If the United
States court follows Convention procedure and enters a $100 million judg-
ment against Tunisia, the collection of these funds must be carried out
according to United States law. 67 While the Convention requires the domes-
tic court to assert jurisdiction over the award and to enforce it, the execution
is left up to domestic law. 68 As a further difficulty, United States law does
provide for a "restrictive" form of sovereign immunity to prevent the
specified executions against sovereign states.69
Therefore, in a case where the defendant is the host country, it is possible
for a corporation to force a sovereign state to participate in arbitration, win
an arbitral award, have the award recognized and enforced in a domestic
nation's legal system-but then to lose on the crucial execution issue.
Officials at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes point out that investor plaintiffs may solve this problem by forum
shopping for a domestic legal system that follows a restrictive view of
sovereign immunity.7°
III. Worldwide Implementation of the Convention
Despite this problem of execution, the ICSID treaty is being successfully
implemented throughout the world. Over one thousand investment con-
tracts have incorporated provisions for resolving disputes within the ICSID
framework. 7' References to ICSID arbitration are contained in eleven
national investment laws 7 2 and in eighty-seven bilateral investment
73treaties.
64. Id. at arts. 50-52.
65. Id. at art. 54(1), (2).
66. Id. at art. 54(2).
67. Id. at art. 55.
68. Id.
69. 28 U.S.C., §§ 1609-1611 (1976).
70. Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration, 38 ARB. J. 34, 46-48
(1983).
71. As there is no way to effectively tabulate data on this point, the figure is an educated
estimate. Id. A 1974 study estimated that ICSID clauses protected over $2 billion of interna-
tional investment. Broches, Arbitration in Investment Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: DOCUMENTS AND COLLECTED PAPERS, pt. 2, 292, 299 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1974).
More recent information has indicated that the $2 billion figure may be extremely modest.
Interview with Georges R. Delaume, Senior Legal Adviser to the World Bank, in Washington,
D.C. (May 24, 1984).
72. Delaume, supra note 47, at 2 n. 6 ICSID, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT Annex 4; see
ICSID Newsletters (Jan. 1983, Jul. 1983).
73. Delaume, supra note 47, at 2 n. 7; see ICSID Newletters (Jan. 1983, Jul. 1983).
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Indeed, a number of corporations dealing with foreign governments are
reluctant to make investments in nations which have not signed the
Convention. 74 With the exception of sovereignty conscious Latin Amer-
ica, 75 the vast majority of non-"Communist Bloc' 76 countries have already
joined the ICSID treaty.77 As a whole, international arbitration is becoming
an increasingly popular method for resolving commercial disputes. 78
In all, the Centre has handled twenty disputes arising out of ICSID
provisions in multinational contracts. 79 As evidence of the Centre's growing
popularity as an alternative to political confrontation, over half of these
conflicts have come to ICSID within the last three years. 80 Thirteen of these
74. This reluctance has been communicated to the ICSID Secretariat by potential investors.
Interview with Delaume, supra note 46.
75. Latin American nations have historically distrusted international mediation of any kind.
Most of these countries adhere to the so-called "Calvo Clause" of the Andean Foreign
Investment Code which prohibits intervention of any kind of one state into the affairs of
another state. Andean Investment Code, done Dec. 30, 1970, reprinted in 111. L.M. 126 (1971).
This strong notion of state sovereignty is a reaction to years of exploitation and intervention at
the hands of colonialist nations. From this, Latin America has developed the theory that all
investment disputes must be settled internally as a matter of sovereignty. For a much more
thorough discussion of this problem, see Comment, A Courageous Course for Latin America:
Urging the Ratification of the ICSID, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 157 (1982); Szasz, The Investment
Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 256, 258 (1971); see also Gopal,
International Centre on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 591,
602-03 (1982); Delaume, supra note 16, at 3-4; McLaughlin, supra note 29 at 223-24; Amer-
singhe, The ICSID and Development through the Multinational Corporation, 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 793, 798 (1976); Abbott, Latin America and InternationalArbitration Conven-
tions: The Quandary of Non-Ratification, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (1976); Ryans & Baker, The
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 65, 65-66
(1976); Broches, supra note 12, at 348. Despite this initial Latin American recognition of
ICSID, many of these countries have now recognized the long-term advantages of increased
foreign investment capital and technology that may be generated through international invest-
ment cooperation. Comment, supra, at 157-58. Paraguay and El Salvador have now both
signed and ratified the Convention. Costa Rica has signed but not yet ratified. News from
ICSID, supra note 20, at 1.
76. However, Romania, a member of the Warsaw Pact, is a member of ICSID. ICSID,
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1983).
77. In all, eighty-nine countries have signed the Convention and eighty-five signers have
ratified. News from ICSID, supra note 20, at 1.
78. See Aksen, International Arbitration-Its Time Has Arrived, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
LAW 247 (1982); Coulson, A New Look at International Commercial Arbitration, 14 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L LAW 359 (1982). For instance, the International Chamber of Commerce is nearing
hearing about 250 commercial cases annually. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Document No.
825-25/3 (1981), see Haight, International Arbitration, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAW 253
(1982).
79. While cases are kept confidential by ICSID, the Centre acknowledges that it has handled
eighteen arbitrations and two conciliations. Interview with Delaume, supra note 46. ICSID
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1985).
80. Nine cases were handled in ICSID's first fifteen years of operation. Already, more than
this amount has been handled in the last three years. One explanation for the paucity of cases in
ICSID's early history is that it usually takes many years before a dispute arises out of an
international investment contract. Id.
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cases were amicably settled, one dispute was resolved by an arbitral ruling,
and seven cases are still pending.
8 1
While all proceedings are kept confidential, the Convention's initial pro-
hibition of diplomatic protection8 2 has definitely been a strong factor in
eliminating political tensions from disputes channeled through ICSID. s3
One published example of such an arbitration is Alcoa Mineral v. Govern-
ment of Jamaica.84 Here, an American corporation entered into a complex
twenty-five-year agreement with Jamaica whereby Alcoa would construct
an alumina refining plant in exchange for major tax concessions and long-
term leases on bauxite mining.8 5 The deal also contained a clause providing
for ICSID arbitration for any dispute arising from the agreement.8 6
After political changes occurred within Jamaica, however, government
officials announced that they intended to limit their adherence to the Con-
vention to exclude disputes involving natural resources. 87 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Jamaica reneged on the contract with Alcoa. 88 When Alcoa submitted
the conflict to ICSID, Jamaica cited the earlier withdrawal of consent and
refused to respond to the request for arbitration.8 9
In a ruling that has greatly strengthened ICSID authority and bolstered
the confidence of parties relying on arbitration clauses, 90 the ICSID panel
unanimously asserted jurisdiction over the dispute by reaffirming that a
party may not unilaterally withdraw consent to arbitrate. 9' While a party can
limit consent under Article 25, the panel declared that this operated to only
affect "potential future investors" (emphasis added) 92 and held that any
other ruling "would very largely, if not wholly, deprive the Convention of
any practical value. " 93 Following this decision, Jamaica and Alcoa amicably
settled their differences.94
Although the Centre has overseen the arbitration of many cases to date,
there has only been one test of the ICSID framework in a judicial setting. In
81. Id.
82. ICSID CONVENTION art. 27(1). Diplomatic protection is forbidden from the time that
parties consent to ICSID until a contracting state refuses to comply with the award rendered in
the dispute.
83. Interview with Delaume, supra note 46; Sutherland, supra note 13. The existence of
ICSID also has a strong deterrent effect on potential disputes by persuading parties to arrive at
a settlement out of the fear that the other party will take the dispute to the Centre. Gopal, supra
note 75, at 592.
84. See Schmidt, supra note 60.
85. Id. at 93.
86. Id. at 93-94.
87. Id. at 95.
88. Id. at 94-95.
89. Id. at 95.
90. Id. at 92-93.
91. Id. at 92-93, 103.
92. Id. at 103.
93. Id.
94. ICSID, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 34-39 (1981).
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Benvenuti & Bonfant Co. v. The Government of the People's Republic of
Congo,95 the Government of Congo96 contracted with an Italian investor
97
to create a "semi-public" company to manufacture plastic bottles. 98 The
contract contained the following provision:
Any dispute between the parties arising out of the performance of this Agree-
ment, which could not be amicably settled, shall be submitted to arbitration within
the framework of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, of March 18, 1965, prepared by the
I.B.R.D. [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], the pro-
ceedings shall be conducted in the French language. The parties hereby agree to
abide and to waive any right to any appeal or other power (sic) of such award. The
costs of arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties.
99
After a dispute broke out between the parties to the contract, the Italian
corporation acted in accordance with the terms of the contract and re-
quested an ICSID arbitral panel. 100 The panel rendered an award in favor of
the corporation.10 1 Upon receiving this award, Benvenuti & Bonfant im-
mediately filed an action against the Congo in the Tribunal de Grande
Instance10 2 of Paris.10 3 Relying on the ICSID treaty, the French court
recognized the award and entered a judgment for the Italian investor subject
to a reservation that no execution of this judgment could be carried out
against any assets located in France without prior authorization of the
court. 104
Contending that this reservation made enforcement of the award impossi-
ble, the Italian corporation persuaded the Court of Appeals of Paris to
delete the limitation. 105 According to the Senior Legal Adviser of the
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the higher court properly
interpreted the Convention 10 6 by ruling that enforcement and execution
were two separate and distinct procedures. 10 7 Article 54 requires that the
court enforce the ICSID award by making it a valid title on the basis of which
95. 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981) (English translation).
96. Congo signed the Convention on Dec. 27, 1965 and ratified it on June 23, 1966.
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1983).
97. Italy signed the Convention on Nov. 18, 1965 and ratified it on Mar. 29, 1971. Id.
98. 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981).
99. Id. at 879.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. France signed the Convention on Dec. 22, 1965 and ratified it on Aug. 21,1967. ICSID,
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1983).
103. 20 I.L.M. 879 (1981).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 880-82.
106. Delaume, Introductory Note to Benvenuti & Bonfant Co. v. The Government of the
People's Republic of Congo, 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981). Mr. Delaume is the Centre's Senior Legal
Adviser.
107. 20 I.L.M. 880 (1981).
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measures of execution can be taken. 108 While the lower court fulfilled this
first step, it exceeded its authority by dealing with the second step---the
execution (or attachment) of the Congo's property. 109 The Court of Appeals
ruled that the possibility of subsequent measures of execution is a question
of immunity that should not be dealt with in the initial state of the recogni-
tion and enforcement of ICSID awards. 110
As to the possibility of the Congo successfully pleading sovereign immu-
nity at a later stage in the proceedings, a French commentator has pointed
out that the French doctrine of immunity for sovereign states is in a state of
confusion. However, it is clear from the outcome of the Benvenuti &
Bonfant case that the French doctrine is completely compatible with full
implementation of ICSID awards in that the court freely recognized and
enforced the judgment of the Arbitral Tribunal. Since the French court has
acted, the Congo has complied with the award in full. 1 l
IV. Adherence to the Convention by the United States
While the French legal system has readily implemented the ICSID
framework, the less flexible nature of American sovereign immunity is more
problematic. This poses a potential conflict with the international obliga-
tions derived from the Convention.
As a treaty to which the United States is a party, the provisions of the
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes become "the su-
preme Law of the Land. ' 112 It becomes part of American law with an
importance equal to statutes." 3 Indeed, Congress passed the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 19661 14 to specifically hold
that ICSID awards "shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United
States." The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be
enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were
a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction."" 5 Conversely, this
acceptance of the ICSID treaty further obligates the United States to restrict
itself to the very limited role allowed to domestic legal systems by the
Convention and to abstain from all ICSID proceedings short of the enforce-
ment of certified awards.
1 16
108. ICSID CONVENTION art. 54; 20 I.L.M. 881 (1981); see Delaume, supra note 106, at 878.
109. ICSID CONVENTION art. 55; 20 I.L.M. 881 (1981); see Delaume, supra note 106 at 878.
110. 20 I.L.M. 881 (1981).
111. News from ICSID, supra note 20, at 2.
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
113. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (treaty is equivalent to an act of Congress); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 131(c), comment (c), (d) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (treaties are expressly
made binding obligations of the United States).
114. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650, 1650a (1976).
115. Id. § 1650a (a).
116. ICSID CONVENTION arts. 25-26, 41, 48-54.
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The limited powers of the court to recognize, enforce, and carry out an
ICSID award, sharply conflict with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
general principle of the doctrine, as stated by Chief Justice Marshall, is that
"sovereigns are not presumed without explicit declaration to have opened
their tribunals to suits against other sovereigns." 1 7 For reasons of comity
and deference to the Executive Branch, a foreign sovereign is immune from
any action in an American court. For instance, the sovereign state of Tunisia
cannot automatically be sued in a domestic court of the United States.
Therefore, in order for America to effectively implement the goals of the
Convention, the scope of United States law must be accommodated with the
ICSID notions of abstention and sovereign immunity.
A. THE RULE OF ABSTENTION
One of the most fundamental principles of the Convention is that it creates
an autonomous, self-contained system for dispute resolution. The ICSID
apparatus operates in total independence from domestic legal systems.118
Once parties agree to be under its framework, the Convention prohibits any
foreign intervention:
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise
stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other
remedy. 119
In this manner, the parties are assured that their dispute is free from outside
scrutiny and influences. Thus, the problem is prevented from escalating into
a political conflict.
The adherence of the United States to this rule of abstention was recently
tested in MINE v. Guinea. 2 0 Here, the Republic of Guinea entered into an
investment agreement with a Liechtenstein121 corporation to transfer baux-
ite to foreign markets. 122 The contract expressly provided for ICSID arbitra-
tion as a mechanism for solving potential future disputes. 123 Nevertheless,
when a dispute terminated the contract and Guinea refused to cooperate in a
settlement, the corporation sued Guinea in an American court to enforce
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (AAA).124
Despite the fact that the parties had not contemplated this outcome, the
court granted an order compelling arbitration and, after Guinea failed to
117. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972),
paraphrasing, The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
118. See ICSID CONVENTION arts. 26-27, 41, 44.
119. Id. at art. 26.
120. 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71 (1983).
121. While Liechtenstein is not a member of ICSID, the court assumed that the plaintiff had
sufficient contact with Switzerland to quality as a Swiss corporation.
122. 693 F.2d 1094, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1096-97.
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comply with this ruling, entered a judgment against the sovereign state for
the AAA's award of $25 million. 125 In doing so, the court asserted jurisdic-
tion by ruling that consent to ICSID constituted a waiver of sovereign
immunity since the Centre was located in Washington, D.C. 12 6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
lower court's invasion of ICSID's autonomy. 127 Conforming United States
law to the Convention, the court of appeals held that ICSID is a unique and
distinct international body governed by the rules of the ICSID treaty-
which prevents any type of domestic intervention until a final award is
rendered. 128
A prime mover for this result, the U.S. Departments of State and Justice
filed an amicus brief arguing for the application of a rule of abstention.
129
The Executive Branch pointed out that the United States has been a strong
supporter of the Centre since its inception and has passed legislation provid-
ing "for mandatory enforcement of awards of ICSID tribunals in United
States courts, with review restricted in accordance with the Convention
(emphasis added)." 30 In order to give the Centre the necessary strength to
stimulate investment and settle international disputes, the Executive argued
that resort to ICSID must be an exclusive remedy totally free from foreign or
international litigation. 13' Thus, national and diplomatic remedies are un-
available once consent to ICSID arbitration is given.132 Further, under the
Convention, the Centre is an independent entity with "full international
personality., 133 Any consent to participate in a future ICSID arbitration is a
consent specifically limited to ICSID proceedings.1 34 Therefore, an agree-
ment to arbitrate under the auspices of the Centre is not a waiver of
immunity from the courts of any other international entity, including the
United States.
Thus, MINE v. Guinea establishes a firm commitment on the part of the
United States to abide by the rule of abstention. It fully recognizes the
United States treaty obligation to allow the Centre to operate as a fully
125. 505 F. Supp. 141, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
126. Id. at 142-43.
127. 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71 (1983).
128. Id. at 1103.
129. Brief for Intervenor at 50-52, MINE v. Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 71 (1983).
130. Id. at 45.
131. Id. at 43-44, 46-47; see Amersinghe, Dispute Settlement Machinery in Relations between
States and Multinational Enterprises-With Particular Reference to the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 11 INT'L LAW. 45, 47 (1977).
132. Brief for Intervenor, supra note 130, at 46-47.
133. ICSID Convention art 18.
134. MINE v. Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71
(1983).
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autonomous international organization, distinct from American legal pro-
cesses and rules of immunity.
B. CONSENT TO ICSID AS WAIVER
While establishing the United States commitment to the rule of absten-
tion, the court of appeals in MINE v. Guinea never decided whether the
consent of a foreign state to ICSID arbitration would waive sovereign
immunity from the United States enforcement of afinal ICSID award. 135 In
other words, the case left open the conflict between the enforcement of
awards and sovereign immunity. This is not a problem if, for example,
Tunisia obtains an award against a French corporation. Tunisia merely
needs to take the award to a court of any ICSID contracting state to receive
an enforceable judgment. The difficulty arises, however, when French
investors try to enforce an award against the sovereign state of Tunisia and
Tunisia vigorously objects to the court proceeding on the basis of sovereign
immunity.
The court in MINE v. Guinea addressed this problem by pointing out
that, under Article 54 of the treaty and its United States implementing
legislation, ICSID awards "are to be enforced as judgments of sister
states." 136 However, when examining the issue of sovereign immunity, the
court made the very limited observation that the "ICSID agreement did not
contemplate the involvement of domestic courts before the enforcement
stage . . .,,137 Hence, the court shied away from the clash between the
enforcement of ICSID awards against foreign states and the bar imposed by
sovereign immunity since the ICSID proceeding in MINE v. Guinea had not
ripened into a final award demanding immediate recognition.
Commentators on the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, however, have resolved this conflict between enforcing ICSID
awards against foreign states and the United States codification of sovereign
immunity through resorting to the waiver theory. 138 This theory focuses on
an important exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976:139
Explicit or implicit waiver of immunity by a foreign state.140
135. Id. at 1103 n. 14.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Delaume, supra note 21, at 791; see Note, MINE v. Guinea: Effect on U.S. Jursidiction
of an Agreement by a Foreign Sovereign to Arbitrate Before the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 16 GEO. WASH. J. OF INT'L L. & EcON. 451, 464 (1982);
Kahale, Arbitration and Choice of Law Clauses as Waivers of Jursidictional Immunity, 14
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & P. 29, 40 (1981).
139. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
140. Id. at § 1605(a)(1).
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According to these commentators, a sovereign state which consents 141 to
ICSID arbitration is legally and irrevocably bound by this consent under
Article 25 of the Convention. 142 Since consenting to the application of the
treaty necessarily means that the contracting party agrees to the Article 53
provisions mandating compliance to the terms of the binding award 143 and
agrees with the Article 54 clause requiring courts of other states to recognize
and enforce this binding award as if it was a final judgment from an equiva-
lent tribunal, 144 the state consenting to the ICSID jurisdiction is agreeing
that the award may be enforced by the courts of another state. As the
Convention qualifies as a treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 45 and requires parties to comply with the terms of its awards, 146 the
ICSID Convention is subject to pacta sunt servanda-parties are bound by
international law to perform their treaty obligations in good faith. 147 Conse-
quently, contracting states are obligated to allow awards arising from ICSID
disputes to be enforced in foreign courts. This constitutes a waiver of
immunity from the jurisdiction of the foreign court. 148
Under international law, it is recognized that a state may waive its
immunity from jurisdiction either expressly or by implication. 149 As pre-
viously shown, this principle has also been adopted in the United States.
150
Further, United States courts have specifically ruled that an agreement to
arbitrate constitutes a waiver of immunity at the selected place of
arbitration.' 51 This site of arbitration need not even be within the United
141. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 11 establishes that
consent to being bound by a treaty may be expressly subject to ratification. B. WESTON, R. FALK
& A. D'AMATO, BASic DocuMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 61-62 (1980).
The ICSID Convention calls for both signature and ratification. ICSID CONVENTION arts. 67,68.
However, the member state must further give written consent to be bound in the investment
agreement. Id. art. 25(1).
142. Id. art. 25; see Sutherland, supra note 13, at 380-82; McLaughlin, supra note 29, at 223;
Schmidt, supra note 60, at 101-03; Ryans & Baker, The International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 65, 67 (1976); O'Hare, The Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 6 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 146, 149 (1972).
143. ICSID CONVENTION art. 53(1).
144. Id. art. 54(1).
145. The Vienna Convention in Article l(1)(a) defines "treaty" as "an international agree-
ment concluded between States in written form and governed by international law
WESTON, supra note 141, at 60.
146. ICSID CONVENTION art. 53(1).
147. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26. WESTON, supra note 141, at 65.
148. Delaume, supra note 21, at 800,
149. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 456(1)(a), at 198 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
151. MINE v. Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71
(1983). Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisario General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); see RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 204-05 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
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States if the arbitration is pursuant to an international agreement1 52 such as
the United Nations Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards. 1
53
Consenting to ICSID arbitration, therefore, constitutes a waiver of
sovereign immunity as soon as a final award is reached and enforcement is
sought. By entering into a binding contract that both parties understand may
be ultimately enforced by a foreign court, the country that has agreed to be
bound by these terms must have necessarily waived immunity.
Using the hypothetical example of the North African dispute once again,
Tunisia signed the contract with the French corporations with full realiza-
tion that, as a country bound by the Convention, consent to a contract with
an ICSID provision was binding and irrevocable. 154 The Government of
Tunisia also understood that it had an obligation to comply with the terms of
any award arising from a dispute provided by the Centre. 155 This award,
under the Convention's regime, would be recognized and enforced by any of
the other nations bound by the Convention. 56 Indeed, the courts of the
United States and each other member nation are obligated by treaty to at
least enforce binding ICSID awards. Therefore, consent to an ICSID provi-
sion is logically a waiver of sovereign immunity to the enforcement of a final
award.
Further, United States law clearly recognizes waivers of sovereign im-
munity to jurisdiction. Tunisia has in essence agreed to have a final judg-
ment of an ICSID award enforced by all Convention states. More impor-
tantly, the United States is bound by Article 54 of the ICSID treaty and its
implementing statute to enforce such an award.
Even if the American courts insisted that Tunisia's consent was not a
waiver, the signing of the Convention by the Executive Branch would take
precedence over the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the Act, a
finding of sovereign immunity is "Subject to existing international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this
Act ...,17 As the Convention was signed previously to the passage of the
Act, its provisions are an exception to sovereign immunity.
Indeed, in this tangled area of international affairs, the Judiciary should
always defer to the Executive since it is the latter that has the final say-both
152. Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp.
1175 (D.D.C. 1980); Ipitrate International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp.
324 (D.D.C. 1978).
153. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 30 U.N.T.S. 3, codified at 9 U.S.C., § 201 (1976).
154. ICSID CONVENTION art. 25(1).
155. Id. art. 53(1).
156. Id. art. 54(1).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
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in international law and under the United States Constitution 15 8 -on the
implementation of foreign policy.' 59
C. THE EXECUTION OF ICSID JUDGMENTS
While Articles 53 and 54 require the courts of the contracting states to
enforce awards certified by the Centre, 160 this is not the end of the legal
process. Once sovereign immunity to the jurisdiction against the foreign
state is denied and a judgment in favor of the private investor is entered,
there is still the question of execution. As in the issue of enforcing ICSID
awards, there is no problem under the Convention for a nation to execute a
judgment against a foreign investor. The sovereign state need only present a
certified ICSID award to the domestic legal system of an ICSID member, 161
obtain a judgment against the corporation, 62 and execute upon the judg-
ment according to the process employed by the domestic court.' 63
The situation is much more complex, however, where a foreign state
refuses to comply with an ICSID award. While the United States court is
required by the Convention to enter a judgment against the errant
sovereign, execution upon this judgment is quite another matter. In other
words, even after jurisdiction in a court is obtained and a final judgment is
rendered, there is still the possibility that the defendant state could raise
sovereign immunity to prevent the execution of the judgment.
Article 55(1) of the Convention provides that: "Nothing in Article 54 [the
enforcement of judgments] shall be construed as derogating from the law in
force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or any
foreign State from execution." 164 Since the drafters of the ICSID treaty
could not decide which competing view of execution to adopt, they passed a
compromise measure allowing each member state to execute the judgment
according to domestic rules of collection law and sovereign immunity. 165
Thus, it is theoretically possible for a foreign state to resist execution in a
domestic legal system which strongly adheres to sovereign immunity. In the
Convention's twenty-three year history, however, no state has ever raised
the defense of sovereign immunity against the execution of an ICSID
award. 166 The People's Republic of Congo, which had to be taken before a
French court due to her initial lack of compliance with an award, has since
158. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
159. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Hearings on H.R. 15785 Before
the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 96 (1966) (Statement of Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State).
160. ICSID CONVENTION arts. 53, 54.
161. Id. at arts. 53(1), 54(1).
162. Id. at art. 54(1).
163. Id. at art. 54(3).
164. Id. at art. 55(1).
165. Interview with Delaume, supra note 46.
166. Telephone interview with Georges R. Delaume, Legal Advisor to the Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (Nov. 29, 1983).
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paid in full after the court entered an adverse judgment. 167 These defendant
states justly fear the elaborate legal, political, financial, and moral deter-
rents to avoidance of an ICSID award.
1. Hypothetical
In order to demonstrate the interplay of these deterrents as well as the
appropriate role of United States courts, assume that a federal district court
has entered a judgment against Tunisia and in favor of the French corpora-
tions. If Tunisia attempts to raise the defense of sovereign immunity to block
execution, the investors may be able to successfully assert the provision of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act allowing for execution upon "com-
mercial" property1 68 of a foreign state which has implicitly waived its
immunity. 169
Under this theory, a foreign state which consents to the ICSID framework
implicitly waives its right to immunity from execution due to the Article 53
mandate that nations are bound to comply to the terms of an award.'
70
Although Article 55 provides that nothing in the enforcement section of the
Convention should be construed to repeal a member nation's domestic laws
concerning sovereign immunity from execution,t 71 it does not lessen a
party's treaty commitments. According to Georges R. Delaume, the Senior
Legal Adviser for the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes:
[T]he fact that under the Convention contracting states do not surrender their
right to immunity from execution in no way relieves these states from their treaty
commitments. Thus, it is clear that if a contracting state party to a dispute pleaded
immunity, either in its own courts or in those of another contracting state, in order
to frustrate the enforcement of an ICSID award, that state would violate its
obligation to comply with the award. Moreover, the state involved would be
exposed to various sanctions, which are expressly provided for in the
Convention. 172
The drafters of the Convention included Article 55 merely because they
could not reconcile the varying interpretations of sovereign immunity from
execution and thought it would be best to let each state decide for itself. 173
167. News from ICSID, supra note 20, at 2.
168. There is, of course, some difficulty in distinguishing "commercial" property from mere
investment assets. See In the Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Texas 1982);
Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 405 (D.N.J. 1979).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (1976). There are also applicable exceptions to sovereign
immunity where the property to be executed upon was for the commercial activity upon which
the claim is based and where the property was taken by the foreign state in violation of
international law. Id. §§ 1610(a)(2), (3).
170. ICSID CONVENTION art. 53(1).
171. Id. art. 55.
172. Delaume, supra note 21, at 801.
173. Farley, Commentary: The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, 5 DUQUESNE L. REV. 19, 28 (1966); Conversation with
Delaume, supra note 166.
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Presumably, the drafters wished that some forms of sovereign immunity
from execution should exist, such as a bar to the attachment of embassy
property, but could not agree on the precise limiting guidelines. Hence, they
left the matter totally up to the jurisdiction where the plaintiff party sought
to enforce the ICSID award. It is important to note that nothing in Article 55
creates a right in-or even encourages-the defendant party to raise or
retain sovereign immunity. The Convention is silent on this issue.
Therefore, reading the treaty as a whole, member states have an obliga-
tion to comply with the terms of an award and the enforcing state must issue
a judgment based on the award. The award is then executed according to the
domestic procedures of the enforcing state. Any void created by the silence
of Article 55 is filled by the obligation in Article 53 to comply with the ICSID
decision.
However, if a defending party such as Tunisia decided to actively fight
execution of the judgment by affirmatively exercising sovereign immunity,
this must be considered an active attempt to shirk its commitment to be
bound by the terms of the award. The refusal to be bound by the judgment
places compliance with the award in obvious jeopardy. Thus, Tunisia
violates the complied waiver stemming from her obligation to comply with
the Convention.
In response to this argument, the sovereign state may argue that its
consent to comply with an ICSID award must be read in light of the
Convention's provision that a state's right to sovereign immunity from
execution remains unaffected. Under this paradoxical line of reasoning, a
foreign state's agreement to adhere to the ICSID framework is limited to not
include execution. For example, Tunisia may claim an obligation to abide by
any award until the point when a plaintiff attempts to collect on this commit-
ment.
Assuming that a court may find some credibility in this hypothetical line of
argument, the French corporations might still be able to maneuver around
Tunisia's assertion of immunity due to the general erosion of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity throughout Western nations.' 74 In the case of the
United States, statutory law recognizes a broad exception for commercial
activities. 175 Therefore, even if Tunisia's consent to ICSID arbitration is not
seen as a waiver of immunity from execution because of the silence of
Article 55, its commercial assets in America may still be attached if these
174. Sornarajah, Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 31
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 661,661-63 (1982); Delaume, supra note 16, ch. 11, at 1; Sinclair, The Law
of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, 149 HAGUE RECUEIL 114 (1980), see also,
Broches, supra note 20, at 209; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 103
(5th ed. 1967).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (1976).
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properties qualify as "commercial activities" under the statute1 76 and the
requisite jurisdictional contacts with the United States are fulfilled. 177
Indeed, as one commentator has pointed out, the execution of an ICSID
award does not fall into one of the areas for which the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was instituted to protect. 178 The rationale for the doctrine was to
ensure that the court did not encroach onto the political and international
roles of the Executive.' 79 As the purpose of the Convention is to take
dispute resolution out of politics by establishing a neutral international
forum180 where both the state and the investor can be on an equal footing,
there is little danger of an execution of Tunisia's commercial holdings
176. A "commercial activity" is defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as "either
a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(d)(1976). See Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org'n, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981)
(activity of Syrian company buying grain from United States constitutes a "commercial activ-
ity"); Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (joint venture
between Irish companies and Americans to manufacture cosmetic containers is a "commercial
activity"); Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D.Pa. 1981) (Turkish gun
manufacturer which imported weapons in United States did engage in a "commercial activ-
ity"); China Nat'l Chemical Import & Export Corp. v. M/V Lago Hualaihue, 504 F.Supp. 684
(D. Md. 1981) (Chilean ship delivering cargo engaged in a "commercial activity"); butsee East
Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Romanian
trading company's interference with plaintiff's contract to purchase Romanian cement did not
constitute a "commercial activity"); see also note 168, supra. It is possible that the hypothetical
Tunisian expropriation of French investment assets may not constitute a "commercial activity"
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under this scenario, the hypothetical plaintiffs
would have to provide evidence that the Tunisian investments constituted "commercial activi-
ties" or take their United States judgment to be executed in another jurisdiction.
177. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides, in part, that:
The property in the United States of a foreign state ... used for commercial activity in the
United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, upon a judgment
entered by a court of the United States . . . if . . . the property is or was used for the
commercial activity upon which the claim is based...
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2)(1976). The concept "commercial activity carried on in the United States
by a foreign state" is defined as "commercial activity carried on by such state and having
substantial contact with the United States." Id. § 1603(a)(e) (emphasis added). See Gibbons v.
Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("substantial contacts" with United
States exist where substantial contract negotiations occurred in United States or substantial
aspects of contract to be performed in America); but see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Virginia, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), affirmed 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), reversed on other
grounds 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983) (letter of credit in and of itself does not constitute "substantial
contacts" with United States); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 517 F. Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1981),
affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (communica-
tion of Irish agents to American plaintiffs through mail, telephone, and telegraph does not
constitute "substantial contacts" with United States). Unless the hypothetical French plaintiffs
demonstrate "substantial contacts" existing between their dispute and the United States, the
American judgment may have to be executed elsewhere.





infringing upon our international relations with that country. Therefore, a
waiver of immunity from execution or an attachment of commercial assets
would be in the long run interests of all the countries of the world.
2. Model Clause
To prevent having to go through all this legal rigamarole in order to execute
upon a judgment against a foreign state, many banking institutions lending
money to governments are requiring that the borrower accompany an
ICSID provision with an express waiver of immunity from execution.1 81 A
model clause suggested by the Centre reads:
The [name of Contracting State] hereby irrevocably waives any claim to immunity
in regard to any proceedings to enforce any arbitral award rendered by a Tribunal
constituted pursuant to this Agreement, including, without limitation, immunity
from service of process, immunity from jurisdiction of any court, and immunity of
any of its property from execution.' 82
Bankers generally use a more simplified version: "The Borrower waives any
immunity from which it could claim as a sovereign in the courts in which
execution of the [ICSID] award would be sought." 183
There can be no doubt that such an express waiver of immunity written
into the investment contract would satisfy the waiver requirements of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Investors planning to enforce any
ICSID award in the United States courts should take pains to follow the
example of bankers in this area. The added clause circumvents the previous
confusion and guarantees American adhesion to the Convention.
In the case of the hypothetical French investors who neglected to include
an express waiver of immunity in their contract with Tunisia and do not wish
to become ensconced in the American doctrine of sovereign immunity,
there is still an opportunity to forum shop for other nations with more
relaxed sovereign immunity laws. Generally, nations with leading interna-
tional financial centers are likely to adhere to the restrictive view of
sovereign immunity.1 84 Aside from the United States, this includes the
United Kingdom, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland.18 5 The French investors may examine the different
immunity rules of each of these countries and then file their ICSID award in
the domestic legal system most favorable to their fact situation.
3. Sanctions
Even if Tunisia succeeded in a United States court and the French
corporation failed to find a better forum, the Convention contains two
181. Delaume, supra note 29, at 12.
182. ICSID Model Clauses, supra note 47, at 15.
183. Delaume, supra note 29, at 12.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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express legal sanctions for nations that break their treaty commitments.
Article 27 provides for diplomatic protection on behalf of the private inves-
tor when the "Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply
with the award ...,,t86 Thus, the de-politicization of investment disputes
and procedural equality between parties that is so key to the purpose of the
Convention 187 is lost. Permission for diplomatic intervention on behalf of
one's national is revived. t88 A host of diplomatic sanctions may now ensue.
In addition, any dispute over the application of the Convention would
also invoke Article 64. Under this provision, the problems created by the
defendant nation's exercise of the sovereign immunity defense would be
resolved by the International Court of Justice or another mutually satisfac-
tory method of dispute settlement.
Once the ICSID restraints are out of the way, the full range of financial
pressures will fall upon the errant nation. In a sense, the adverse publicity
may be the strongest remedy operating on behalf of the plaintiff
corporations. 189 Other nations and leading financial institutions will shy
away from a country which refuses to keep its business commitments.
Corporate investors will see the state as being too great a risk. Conceptually,
optimum pressure might be placed on the nation by international lending
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Financial
Corporation.
As a last resort, there is also the danger of political repercussions. The
investment dispute-inspired military and covert interventions that have
plagued the twentieth century are well known to the leaders of countries
desiring foreign capital. These unfortunate incidents of the past should
present a final incentive for sovereign states to comply with the execution of
an ICSID award.
V. Conclusion
The Convention is a powerful tool in de-politicizing investment disputes.
From the standpoint of the United States, the ICSID framework not only
lessens international tension, but provides American corporations with a
safer, more stable investment climate with less risk of expropriation or
unanticipated burdens. 190 As undeveloped nations will also welcome the
increased flow of desperately needed capital stimulated through adherence
to the Convention,191 all parties are left with good relations and growing
186. ICSID CONVENTION art. 27(1).
187. Broches, supra note 20 at 208-09.
188. ICSID CONVENTION art. 27.
189. Interview with Delaume, supra note 46. Former President Carter has suggested that the
presence of ICSID could have vastly aided his Administration in settling claims of American
investors against Iran. Remarks of President Jimmy Carter, in Atlanta, Georgia (Apr. 26,
1984).




prosperity. In a modern age where the traditional international organiza-
tions such as the United Nations and the International Court of Justice have
failed to inspire a consistent international regime of dispute resolution, the
United States should readily recognize that the Convention affords great
promise. And, as Andreas F. Lowenfeld, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the
Department of State at the time of the United States ratification of the
Convention, once pointed out to a congressional hearing that: "As the
country with the greatest amount of international investments, and the
greatest stake in the development and wide acceptance of international law
standards regarding private property, the United States stands to gain
substantially from the Convention."' 92
As a member of the Convention, the United States is bound to enforce the
compliance with ICSID awards and hold itself out to the world as a nation
that has accepted this commitment under international law.1 93 Any signa-
tory to the Convention that voluntarily consents to arbitration in accordance
with the ICSID framework fully realizes that it will be held to the resulting
obligations by the United States and all of the other ratifiers. Each nation
which becomes a full party to the Convention has thus limited its sover-
eignty, explicitly or implicitly, by binding itself to comply with an award
which may eventually be enforced by a foreign court. Where the investor
unfortunately failed to gain the foreign state's express waiver of immunity
from execution, the United States should consider the initial consent to
ICSID as an implied waiver of immunity and allow execution against the
state's commercial assets. 194 Strong diplomatic efforts should aid in obtain-
ing the full compliance, of the foreign government. In this manner, the
United States can both promote controlled dispute resolution as a remedy
for world investment tensions and stand firmly behind its commitments
under international law.
192. Id. at 7.
193. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the principle authoritative source on
the law of treaties. HENKIN, et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 580 (1980). It
is printed at 63 A. J. I. L. 875 (1969). Article 26 of the treaty concerns pacta sunt servanda:
"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith." Id.
at 884. While the United States has never formally ratified this treaty, it has been recognized
and accepted by the U.S. Department of State. S. EXEC. Doc. L. 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
194. This, of course, assumes that the plaintiff has established that defendant's actions
.constitute "commercial activities" under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and that there
is a sufficient nexus between these commercial activities and the United States. See notes 168,
169, 176, 177, supra.
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